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How Banks can Benefit from Partnership with Community
Development Financial Institutions: The Bank Enterprise Awards

Program

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1997, First Union National Bank (First Union) received a
Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) from the federal government worth
over $2 million,' for increasing its loans, grants, investments and
services to community development financial institutions (CDFIs) by
more than $28 million during the same fiscal year. 2 These CDFIs, in
turn, used First Union's capital and expertise to serve low-income
communities by extending financial services to neighborhoods that
traditional banks historically have avoided.
CDFIs, an emerging
sector of loan and venture capital funds, community development
banks, and credit unions, have captured the imagination of traditional
banks, community groups, academics, and public officials in recent
years as tools to reach small markets in an era of financial
consolidation.4 The federal government, for its part, created the
1. Community Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, Profiles of Financial Institutions Selected for
Funding under the 1998 Bank EnterpriseAwards Program (1998) (visited October 23,
1998) < http:lwww.treas.govlcdfil > [hereinafter BEA Profiles].
2. See id.
3. See id. These neighborhoods include low-income urban communities that
experience racial and economic segregation, declining infrastructure and high
concentrations of unskilled labor. Bank reluctance to extend credit is called "redlining,"
a reference to the former bank practice of using a red pen to circle on a map low-income
and African-American neighborhoods in which some banks allegedly chose not to lend.
See generally David E. Runck, An Analysis of the Community Development Banking and
Financial Institutions Act and the Problem of "Rational Redlining" Facing Low-Income
Communities, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 517 (1996) (analyzing the rational and irrational
causes of redlining); see also Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes,
Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1351 (1993) (describing the afflictions of America's inner
cities).
4. See Runck, supra note 3, at 518-20 (describing the factors contributing to credit
problems in low income neighborhoods). Commentators generally agree that financial
industry consolidation and the search for economies of scale lead to declining access to
credit in small markets such as low-income communities. See id. Other debated factors
include globalization, the small relative credit needs in low-income communities, the lack
of credit worthiness of borrowers, inaccurate perceptions of risk, and explicit racial
discrimination. See id.; see also Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending
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Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund or
Fund), which encompasses the BEA program, to encourage banks to
invest in and partner with CDFIs.
To understand how First Union obtained its award, one must
understand the goals and objectives of the federal government's CDFI
Fund and BEA program. Similarly, to understand the opportunities
these programs provide for banks, one must see the recent trends in
community development and appreciate the success of CDFIs. This
Note discusses the growth of the CDFI industry and shows how banks
and thrifts can benefit from partnerships with CDFIs and funding from
the BEA program. Part II of this Note explains what a CDFI is,
briefly describes the different types of CDFIs and the markets these
institutions serve. 5 Part II also reviews the history of the federal CDFI
Fund, its enabling legislation, and the Fund's principal features.' Part
III focuses on the Fund's BEA program, how the program works, who
has received money in the first round of funding and how banks
apply. 7 In Part IV, this Note considers the controversial history of the
Community Reinvestment Act and how recently implemented
regulatory changes encourage banks to form mutually beneficial
partnerships with CDFIs to meet their CRA obligations. Finally, Part
V concludes that banks and thrifts have an interest in pursuing BEA
program awards and partnering with CDFIs to meet their Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) obligations. 9

Discrimination:A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEx. L. REV. 787 (1995) (arguing
that banks with few information networks in low-income African-American communities

will find it more costly to evaluate applicants for loans from those communities); Anthony
D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural
Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L.

REV. 1465 (1994) (arguing that the small principal amount of loans needed in low income
communities contributes to bank reluctance to do business in those communities).

5. See infra notes 10-36 and accompanying text.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra notes 37-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A GROWTH INDUSTRY

What is a CDFI?

A.

The term "community development financial institution"
describes a wide array of institutions that operate in markets where
traditional banks do not offer accessible services.'0 CDFIs can have
different organizational structures. They can be located in urban or
rural areas, and serve low income or small business needs, but they all
share a common purpose; CDFIs operate where traditional lending and
financial service institutions fail to take advantage of a market for
service.
CDFIs are grouped into six broad classifications that use
different structures and respond to different needs for investment:
community development banks (CDBs), 12 community development
corporations (CDCs),' 3 community development credit unions
15
(CDCUs),14 community development loan funds (CDLFs),
6
community development venture capital funds (CDVCF), 1 and micro10. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the markets CDFIs seek to

serve).
11. See Nellie R. Santiago et al., Turning David and Goliath into the Odd Couple:

How the New Community Reinvestment Act Promotes Community Development Financial
Institutions, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 571, 598 (1998) (discussing the different types of CDFIs);
see also Robert W. Shields, Community Development Financial Institutions and the
Community Development FinancialInstitutionsAct of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of-Some
Attention, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 637, 643-52 (describing in greater detail community
development banks, community development credit unions and community development
loan funds).
12. "[CDBs] are federally insured and regulated depository institutions organized
specifically to provide capital and related developmental services." MURRAY A. INDICK &
THOMAS J. DELANEY, INTERSTATE BANKING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACTS: A
SPECIAL REPORT 7.01 (1995) (citing Community Development FinancialInstitutions Act
of 1993: Hearings on S.1275 before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong. 74 (1993) (Testimony of Jeremy Nowak, The Coalition of CDFIs)).
13. Community development corporations are "financial intermediaries that channel
debt and venture capital to low income communities." Id.
14. Community development credit unions are "regulated financial cooperatives
owned and operated by lower income persons." Id.
15. Community development loan funds are "nonprofit unregulated financial
intermediaries that aggregate capital from individual and institutional social investors and
re-lend this money primarily to non-profit housing and business developers." Id.
16. Community development venture capital funds are "organizations that provide
seed [money] and equity assistance to start up businesses in low income communities."
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enterprise loan funds (MELFs). 17 Each structure meets a different
market need, and often the form reflects the resources that a
community has at its disposal.
CDFIs are often associated with urban, low-income
communities.
For instance, Neighborhood Housing Services of
Toledo, Inc., an Ohio based nonprofit corporation, organized two
decades ago with the purpose of bringing public and private resources
together for affordable low income housing."8 Notwithstanding the
frequent association, a CDFI is not required to be in, or service, an
urban area.
The 1998 Presidential Awards for Excellence in
Microenterprise Development recognized as an excellent CDFI North
Carolina's Rural Economic Development Center, created in 1989 "to
provide access to capital to businesses in the state's rural counties." 19
Similarly, CDFIs need not service only low-income needs. The
Seattle, Washington-based Cascadia Revolving Fund has made loans to
over 170 small businesses in its 12 years. This for-profit CDFI has
high success rates. in its businesses and has lost less than 1% of its
total investments.2 °
Information on the number of CDFIs and their loan and
investment activity suggests that they serve a large market. Data has
only recently been collected and will become more reliable over time,
however. Clifford Rosenthal, a representative of the CDFI Coalition,
claims his organization represents over 350 CDFIs including 170
Community Development Credit Unions. His member CDFIs have
"loaned and invested some $4 billion in our nation's most distressed
Id.
17. Micro-enterprise loan funds are "unregulated programs and institutions that
couple human development services with small loans for start up or expansion of self-

employment or micro-business enterprises." Id. For a detailed description of each type
of CDFI, see Santiago, supra note 11, at 599-610. It is beyond the scope of this paper to

examine fully all of the forms CDFIs can take.

Generally, CDFI describes a loose

category of institutions that have community development related activities as their focus.

Banks interested in benefiting from the BEA program through partnerships with CDFIs
must make their investments in certified CDFIs. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at
7.01. The CDFI Fund staff makes this determination. See id.
18. Community Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, Profiles of Orgs. Selected for Funding under
the 1998 Community Dev. Fin. Inst. Program Core Component (1998) (visited Oct. 23,

1998) < http://www.treas.gov/cdfi/ > [hereinafter Core Profiles].
19. Community Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, 1998 Presidential Awards for Excellence in

MicroenterpriseDev. 10 (1998) (visited Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.treas.gov/cdfi/>.
See also Core Profiles, supra note 18.
20. See Core Profiles, supra note 18.
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communities."2 The CDFI Fund, however, has reviewed applications
for and certified only 254 CDFIs as of August 17, 1998.22 This
number does not include all CDFI activity since it represents the
limited number of CDFIs that have approached the federal
government's Fund for certification and financial support. The Fund
claims between $100-$160 million in combined federal, state, local
and private sector activity from fiscal year 1996 which it estimates
should "generate approximately $400 million
in new community
23
decade."
next
the
over
activity
development
As the effects of the CDFI Fund grow, the number of certified
institutions and measures of their activity should become more
reliable. Overall, the community development activity in loans and
investments has come from a wide array of unconventional institutions
designed to meet the needs present in their communities. The total
effect of this activity is only beginning to be seen.
As noted, CDFIs operate in markets where traditional lending
and financial service institutions do not. 24 Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Lawrence Summers describes these markets as "the
emerging markets within our own borders." 25 Commentators and
community groups share concern over the consolidation of traditional
lending institutions based on what consolidation means for small
26
borrowers and for communities that have suffered "disinvestment."
21. Reauthorization of the Community Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Services, 105th Cong. 1104 (1998) [hereinafter Testimony of Rosenthal] (prepared
statement of Clifford Rosenthal for the Coalition of Community Development Financial
Institutions).
22. See Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http://www.treas.gov/cdfi/>. Organizations that seek federal financial support under
the CDFI Fund apply for recognition under eligibility requirements set forth in 12 C.F.R.
§1805.200 and fully described at 12 C.F.R. §§1805.701(b)(1)-(8). See id.
23. 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 18.
24. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25. Lawrence H. Summers, Address to the National Council for Urban Economic

Development Re: Inner Cities (March 2, 1998) (transcript available in LEXIS, Bankng
Library, FEDNEW File) [hereinafter Summers Address].
26. See Runck, supra note 3. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine fully the
debate over "redlining" and industry consolidation that have prompted legislative

initiatives such as the fair lending laws and the Community Reinvestment Act. For more
information on this debate, see Santiago, supra note 11, at 579-83. See also

NATIONAL

COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A PROFILE OF COMMUNITY LENDING IN EIGHT CITIES

(1990) [hereinafter EIGHT CITY PROFILE]; Cassandra Jones Havard, Synergy and Friction
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Summers states, "[a] successful CDFI is perhaps best compared to a
niche venture capital firm that deploys its superior knowledge of an
emerging market niche to invest and manage risk better than other
investors." 27 Typically, CDFIs serve credit and capital needs in
communities where markets do not send adequate signals to traditional
institutions that there is demand for service. These communities often
represent small demand areas with high real or perceived risks.28
Summers notes:
The world over, private financial markets fail when it
comes to very poor. You could say that mainstream
banks do not seek out poor communities - because that
is not where the money is. Market psychology and
other barriers tend artificially to restrict the flow of
capital to certain neighborhoods or to minority groups,
creating clear market failures.29
CDFIs serve as "market scouts ' ' 30 that seek out and invest in
innovative ideas and entrepreneurs that are overlooked by larger
financial institutions.31 Usually, the investors come from within the
community and know the community well; they are entrepreneurs
themselves 32 and facilitate small, familiar business investments. 33 The
types of small investments, made by people working for CDFIs,
include loans and grants to: jewelry vendors, taxi drivers, restaurant

The CRA, BHCs, the SBA, and Community Development Lending, 86 KY. L.J. 617 (1997-

98) (discussing the unique challenges small businesses engaged in community development
activity face in getting credit). See generally Lara L. Spencer, Note, Enforcing the
Community Reinvestment Act: The CourthouseDoors Are Closed, 2 N.C. BANKING INST.
169 (1998) (discussing the challenge community groups face getting standing to sue under
the Community Reinvestment Act).
27. Summers Address, supra note 25.

28. See id; see also Taibi, supra note 4 at 1465 (discussing risk perception).
29. Summers Address, supra note 25.

30. See id; see also Shields, supra note 11, at 641-43 (arguing that CDFIs have
greater experience with and knowledge of the community and thus enable people and

businesses most committed to rebuilding the community).
31. See Summers Address, supra note 25.
32. See id; see also Shields, supra note 11, at 641-43 (pointing out that CDFIs

develop a "specialized market expertise" that allows them to determine what the
community needs and who is best positioned to meet those needs).

33. See Summers Address, supra note 25.
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owners, housing owners, employee-owned, and minority and womenowned businesses, often run out of the home.34
An essential feature of CDFIs is that they are private-sector
institutions that survive based on their ability to meet market demands
without losing to failed investments. The executive director of the
National Community Capital Association reports that in 1997, his 210
member CDFIs maintained a cumulative loss rate of 1.25%
"comparable to the best banks despite the much higher risk profile of
[CDFI] lending. '' 35 Donald Nash, counsel and director of housing
development at Sinergia, a New York non-profit, notes that
competitive pressures in the banking industry will further open
markets for CDFIs, allowing CDFIs to expand in response to need.36
But like the communities they serve, CDFIs often have difficulty with
gaining access to credit and capital they need to do business. Thus,
the federal government created the CDFI Fund to provide government
seed money, services, credits and investments to CDFIs and the BEA
program to encourage banks and thrifts to do the same.
B.

History of the CDFIFund

1. The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Reform Act
of 199437
In 1992, then-Governor Bill Clinton campaigned for the
presidency on the idea of "a network of financial service institutions to
expand access to credit and financial services in lower income urban,
34. See Core Profiles, supra note 18.
35. Reauthorization of the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. 1315 (1998) [hereinafter Pinsky Testimony]
(prepared statement of Mark Pinsky, Executive Director of the National Community

Capitar Association).
36. See Donald A. Lash, The Community Development Banking Act and the Evolution
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 385,

of Credit Allocation Policies, 7 J.
401 (1998).

37. Note the different names associated with the legislation. Using different names

may lead to some confusion. The legislation is referred to as The Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Reform Act, The Community Development Banking and

Financial Institutions Act, and The Community Development Banking Act. See Indick &
Delaney, supra note 12, at

7.01.
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rural and Native American communities." 3' To implement this idea,

President Clinton proposed a start-up fund of $382 million to assist in
the creation of and investment in CDFIs across the country. 39 This
initial plan met with widespread support in the Senate but encountered
some opposition in the House of Representatives from members
friendly to the banking industry. 4 ° Representatives Floyd Blake (D-

NY) and Jim Leach (R-IA) counterproposed with a suggestion to use a
private-sector leverage requirement and rebates on federal deposit
insurance premiums" as incentives for existing banks and thrifts rather than newer CDFIs - to be the link to low income
communities.42 After more than a year of hearings and negotiations,
the two plans - the President's plan to create a fund for CDFIs and the
Congressional plan to give financial assistance to banks - were
combined into a package, added to additional banking sector reforms,
passed and signed into law. 43

The bill converted the proposal to

provide rebates on deposit insurance for banks and thrifts into a more
general plan to provide monetary awards which depository institutions

could do with as they please. This provision was entitled the Bank

38. Summers Address, supra note 25.
39. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.02. For a more detailed description
of the legislative history of the Community Development Banking Act, see Lash,
supra note 36.
40. See Lash, supra note 36, at 394 (quoting Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA) as being
concerned CDFIs would "preempt or replace the lending done by existing institutions").
The article concludes that "CDFIs will not replace conventional banks, and it was not the
intention of Congress in enacting CDBA to create an alternative to conventional lending."
Id. at 400.
7.03[3]. Notably, the idea to use
41. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at
federal deposit insurance credits through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) did not pass into law. Instead, banks and thrifts can receive monetary credits as
awards with which they can do as they please. See id; see also 12 C.F.R. §1806.200
(1997) (indicating no restrictions on how banks use their awards). No obvious reason
exists as to why the federal deposit insurance provision was dropped. In negotiating the
funding levels for the program, the House Appropriations Committee provided no
funding. The Senate version of the bill, H.R. 4624, provided limited funding on condition
that none of the funding went to pay for deposit insurance credits. See Senate Panel
Approves VA/HUD Funding Bill With $25 Million Budget For CDFIs, 63 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 128 (July 25, 1994).
42. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.02; see also Runck, supra note 3, at
536 (arguing that "[b]y providing financial incentives to traditional banks instead of
CDFIs, the government could stimulate more credit to low-income urban areas for each
dollar spent").
43. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.02.
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Enterprise Awards (BEA) program.' The final bill passed with the
widespread support of banks and thrifts, as well as community
development financial institutions and coalitions of community
groups.45
2. A Difficult Beginning for the CDFI Fund
When President Clinton signed into law the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act46 in October of 1994,
he fulfilled his promise of CDFIs 47 using grants, loans and investments
from a federal fund48 to rebuild low income and disinvested
communities. To pay for this plan, the bill authorized $382 million
over four years that existing CDFIs could tap for support. The
CDFIs, in turn, were required to leverage dollars from private-sector
sources to fill their coffers and qualify for the federal support. 49 As a
part of the Act, banks could contribute as private-sector sources to
CDFIs and receive, as a benefit, money from the Fund's BEA
44. See infra notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
45. In fact, the final vote in the House was 410-12, and it was unanimously approved
in the Senate. 142 CONG. REC. S1790 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). The overwhelming support for the final bill appears to have had as much to do
with its regulatory relief provisions as the provisions creating the CDFI Fund. The
American Bankers Association named passage of the bill its top 1994 priority. House
Approves Interstate Branching, CDB Conference Reports, Awaits Senate Action, 63
Banking Rep. (BNA) 187, 188 (Aug. 8, 1994). The Independent Bankers Association of
America seemed equally focused on regulatory relief. After passage, their press release
said, "Regulatory relief at last." Id.
46. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4718 (1994). The bill contains five titles, not all of which
have to do with Community Development Financial Institutions:
Title I is comprised of funding for CDFIs and additional disclosure
requirements to the Truth-in-Lending Act; Title II facilitates the
securitization of small business loans and creates a $50 million fund to
promote capital access programs at the state and local level; Title III
provides substantial paperwork reductions in the bank regulatory
process; Title IV reduces the number of Currency Transaction Reports
required of depository institutions; Title V improves the National
Flood Insurance Program.
Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 1.02[1]-[2].
47. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes a
community development financial institution).
48. See infra notes 62-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Fund and its principle
features).
49. The Fund permits state and local public dollars to be used as matching funds for
the purposes of satisfying the 1-to-i matching fund requirement. See infra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
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program that was also paid for under the Act. ° Under this scheme,
"the government [is put] in partnership with private-sector community
groups and banks to leverage further investment in low income areas
and bring credit to qualifying applicants who may have had trouble
getting it in the past." 5' Anticipating the benefits of the BEA
program, NationsBank pledged $25 million in new investments
directed at CDFIs and Bank of America pledged $50 million. 1 2 These
new investments were announced at the Act's signing ceremony.
Despite this early optimism, three years later the CDFI Fund
was still getting organized in its Department of Treasury office, 3 and
the smaller-than-needed staff could hardly handle the process of
reviewing and certifying CDFIs. 4 Also, the Fund's records were
audited by the General Accounting Office, KPMG Peat Marwick and a
United States House subcommittee for concerns about management
and accounting. 55 Meanwhile, the Fund received 427 applications
50. The Act adopts provisions created under the Bank Enterprise Act of 1991 with
some modification to make it compatible with the Core CDFI Fund program. For more
on the Core CDFI program, see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
51. Community DevelopmentlRegulatory Relief Bill Signed By President Clinton, 63
Banking Rep. (BNA) 442 (Oct. 3, 1994).
52. See id. at 443.
53. The relationship between the CDFI Fund and the Department of Treasury has
evolved. Under the initial legislation, the Fund was established as a wholly owned
government corporation directed by an Administrator who was appointed by the President
and an advisory committee of private citizens and cabinet officials. See Community
Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325 §
4703(a)(2), 108 Stat. 2163 (1994). Subsequent legislation in July 1995 placed the Fund
under the Secretary of the Department of Treasury and made it a permanent office within
the Department. See 12 C.F.R. § 18.1805 (1998).
54. "The 1995 Rescissions Act limited the Fund to 10 full-time-equivalent staff for
fiscal years 1995 and 1996, but for fiscal year 1998, the Fund has a ceiling of 35 full-time
staff." Reauthorization of the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. 250 (1998) [hereinafter Testimony of EnglandJoseph] (prepared testimony of Judy England-Joseph, Director of Housing and
Community Development Issues, Resources Community, and Economic Development
Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office). These limitations left the Fund with
many core management positions unfilled. See id.
55. The results were generally critical.
Reauthorization of the Community
Development FinancialInstitutions Fund:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and
Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. 268
(1998) [hereinafter Testimony of Molnar] (prepared statement of Karyn L. Molnar,
Partner KPMG Peat Marwick LLP). KPMG Peat Marwick issued an "unqualified
opinion" and noted a "material weakness" in accounting for grant award expenses. Id.
Other critics, including Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), found evidence that the Fund
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from CDFIs across the country. Requests for funding for projects
equalled $10 for every $1 available, and the Fund awarded 80 CDFIs
more than $75 million 6 and granted 92 banks and thrifts $30 million
under the BEA program.57 The federal money itself was matched by
over $270 million from banks.58 After a slow start, the Fund was
operational.
The total appropriations Congress granted the Fund have
fluctuated since the Fund's inception.5 9 Original funding legislation
allocated a full $382 million over four years. The total appropriation
stood after three fiscal years at $145 million, far below expected
levels. The Fund, however, was appropriated $80 million in fiscal
year 1998 and has now been appropriated $125 million for fiscal year
1999.60
This recent funding bill brings the Fund's total to $350

doled out its resources primarily to friends of the Clinton family. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Regulatory Relief of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 126 (1998) [hereinafter Testimony of Sen. Shelby]
(prepared statement of Richard Shelby, U.S. Senator). Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL) and
the General Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee issued a report entitled "Review
of Management Practices at the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund"
that claims applications were mishandled and awards were not properly documented.
Consequently, the director of the Fund was replaced. See id. See also 1997 CDFI FUND
ANN. REP. 29; Good Ideas in Need of Some Attention, supra note 11, at 666-67 (arguing
the Fund administrator's sole discretion to decide awards allowed abuse and
mismanagement to occur).
56. See H.R. 3617 - Reauthorization of the Community Development Financial
InstitutionsFund. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Creditof the
House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. 32 (1998) [hereinafter
Testimony of Undersecretary Hawke] (prepared statement of John D. Hawke,
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance of the Treasury).
57. See Testimony of Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 1105.
58. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on VA, HUD and Independent Agencies of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 101 (1998) [hereinafter Testimony of
Secretary Rubin] (prepared statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury).
Debate often arises about cause and effect in leveraging money. Estimates therefore vary.
Who gets the credit for acquiring leveraged dollars, too, always seems to vary. See, e.g.,
Santiago, supra note 11, at 588 n.49.
59. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Community Development Program Has $300M in
Applications, and $31M to Spend, AM. BANKER, Feb. 6, 1996, at 4. "Congress voted to
ax the community development fund in the 1996 budget reconciliation measure, which
President Clinton then vetoed." Id. The resulting compromise reduced the CDFI Fund's
budget to $50 million for fiscal year 1995 after Congress had approved $125 million in the
original 1994 spending bill. See id.; see also, HUD May Get $20 Billion in Fundingfor
FY 1996, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Oct. 9, 1995 at 7 (reporting that the 104th Congress
planned to eliminate all funding for the CDFI Fund for fiscal year 1996).
60. 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 14.
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million and places it on a steep curve of increasing appropriations. 61
C.

PrincipalFeaturesof the Fund: The Core and BEA Programs

The CDFI Fund is mainly a mechanism to transfer federal
funds to communities in need. There are four principal features of the
CDFI Fund created by the Act. The first is a Core program that
assists qualified CDFI applicants in the form of equity investments,
deposits, and grants. 6' A second feature of the Fund, the BEA
program, permits up to one-third of the money appropriated by the
Fund to be earmarked for awards to banks and thrifts in return for
investments in CDFIs and distressed communities. 63 Another principal
feature is the Technical Assistance and Training program that provides
funds for CDFIs to increase their capacity to provide services within
their target communities. 64 The final principal feature of the program,
begun in January 1997, is the Microenterprise Awards program. This
program provides nonmonetary awards that recognize microlending
efforts for the benefit of women, minorities and low-income small
businesses and individuals.65 This article focuses on the first two
features of the CDFI Fund: the Core and BEA programs.
The first two rounds of awards show robust activity for the
CDFI Fund despite Congressional efforts to eliminate the program.66
The Fund has developed this robust activity while being credited with
the tight standards under which it decided the first rounds of awards.67
61. See id.; see infra Appendix, Chart One.

62. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03[l][a] (citing 12 U.S.C. §
4707(a)). See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (explaining the Core program).
63. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12 at 7.03[3]. See infra notes 84-117 and
accompanying text (explaining the BEA program).
64. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03[1][b].
65. 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 12.
66. The Fund was appropriated $125 million for fiscal year 1995. This amount was
reduced to $50 million through budget negotiations in 1995. See id. House Republicans
in the 104th Congress slated the CDFI Fund for complete elimination, but after a
presidential veto of the $16.4 billion rescission bill much funding was restored. See id.

One Senate Republican staff person is quoted as saying, "[Tihere is a lot of support for
providing additional capital for these community development banks, but we figured why
create a new agency when we're thinking of killing all these other agencies." See infra
Appendix, Chart One. See also Olaf de Senerpont Domis, With A GOP Congress,
Development Fund Is on Shaky Ground, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1995, at 4.
67. See Revitalizing America's Economically Distressed Communities: Hearing Before

the House Comm. on Small Bus., 105th Cong. 55 (1998) [hereinafter Testimony of Brown]
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Chart Two in the appendix shows the number of dollars awarded by
the Fund in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 by program.68 In 1996, the
Fund granted 31 CDFIs and 38 depository institutions (banks and
thrifts) a total of $50.3 million under the Core and BEA programs,
respectively. 69 In 1997, the Fund's allocations only increased slightly,
but the number of institutions funded increased more dramatically.70
In 1997, 48 community institutions and 54 depository institutions
received awards totaling $54.8 million.71
1. The Core Program
The Core program constitutes the bulk of allocations under the
CDFI Fund. 72 This program of the CDFI Fund "invests in CDFIs
using flexible tools such as equity investments, loans, grants, and
deposits, depending upon market and institutional needs" 73 to support
the business activities of CDFIs. 74 The type of investment tool differs

(prepared statement of Michael Brown, Chairman and CEO of Sable Bancshares, Inc.).
68. 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 21.

69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. See infra Appendix Chart Two.
72. See 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 18.
73. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
< http:lwww.treas.govlcdfl>.
74. Community institutions must be certified by the CDFI Fund as "Community
Development Financial Institutions" before they are eligible to participate in the Core
Program. See CDFI FUND, CERTIFIED CDFIS AS OF AUG. 17, 1998 (1998). Unless a
bank or thrift is certified as a CDFI, it cannot directly benefit from the Core Program.
See id. Each year the CDFI Fund publishes a list of institutions it certifies. See id.; see
also 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 67-72 (listing institutions certified by the Fund as
CDFIs). The eligibility requirements are described at 12 C.F.R. § 1805.200 (1998) and
12 C.F.R. §§ 1805.701(b)(1)-(8) (1998). The requirements include:
(1) A CDFI shall have the primary mission of promoting community
development;
(2) A CDFI shall serve an Investment Area or Target Population;
(3) A CDFI shall be an entity whose predominant activity is loans or
Development Ivestments;
(4) A CDFI maintains accountability to residents in its Investment
Area or Target Population;
(5) A CDFI shall not be an agency or instrumentality of the
government of the US, or any State; and
(6) A depository institution or holding company may qualify as a
CDFI only if all its affiliates qualify.
12 C.F.R. § 1805.200 (a)-(h) (1998).
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depending on the type of CDFI. For instance, a Community
Development Corporation might require equity investments, just as
any corporation. 75 Similarly, a Community Development Credit
Union might require deposits to bolster its accounts and increase its
ability to lend.76

The CDFI Fund staff "evaluates each applicant

CDFI in a manner similar to a private investor determining the
investment-worthiness of an institution, including assessing financial
performance, management capacity, and market analysis." 77
2. The Leverage Requirement
Banks and thrifts are an integral part of the CDFI Fund
program because of the leverage requirement. The CDFI Core
program requires recipient CDFIs to leverage nonfederal funds to
match the federal awards. 78 CDFIs bear a minimum requirement of $1
to $1 in federal to nonfederal matching funds. 79 These funds must be
pledged before the Fund will allocate its money to a CDFI. In 1996,
thirty-one CDFIs were funded with more than $30 million in matching
funds from nonfederal sources. 8" Over 70% of these institutions
received all of their matching money from private sources such as
banks, thrifts, and foundations. 8' Another 19% of these institutions
received between s70% and 99% of their matching funds from private
sources and only three institutions received less than 70% of money
from nonprivate sources.82 Thus for every one dollar Congress
appropriates through the CDFI Fund, the government gets at least one
more dollar in CDFI investment, primarily from private sources.
These private sector contributions are an integral part of the CDFI
Fund program. Thus, the CDFI Fund is complemented by the BEA
program to give banks and thrifts incentives to provide matching funds
75. See 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 23-28.
76. See id.
77. Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
< http:lwww.treas.govlcdfil>.
78. See 12 C.F.R. § 1805.600 (1998). Nonfederal sources can include any private-

sector source, as well as state and local public sources. See id.
79. See id.
80. See 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 18.
81. See id.

82. See id.
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that CDFIs need.8"
III. THE BANK ENTERPRISE AWARDS PROGRAM

A

How Does the BEA Program Work?

The framework of the Bank Enterprise Awards (BEA) program
comes from the Bank Enterprise Act of 1991.84 Until the Riegle Act
of 1994, however, Congress never funded a program benefiting
banks.8" The stated purpose of the BEA program is to "encourage
insured depository institutions to increase loans, services, and
technical assistance within distressed communities1 6 and to make
equity investments or engage in CDFI8 7 support activities." 8
Furthermore, BEA recipients receive their monies "after successful
completion of the specified activities," 8 9 thus focusing the program on
"performance, not good intentions." 90
When applying to the BEA program, a bank or thrift is judged
based on investment activity above a baseline of prior activity. If a
bank has $50,000 in low interest loans in a qualified "distressed
community" in a fiscal year, and it increases that investment to
$75,000 the next year, it may then apply for a BEA award based on
the $25,000 in increased activity. To calculate the baseline for activity
and to decide what counts as increased activity, the Fund applies
83. See Testimony of England-Joseph, supra note 54, at 249.
84. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03[3]. The BEA Program does not
fund the Act of 1991. Instead, it borrows provisions of the earlier law to establish the
mechanisms for the Fund to operate. See id. The Act of 1991, though never funded, was
designed to provide FDIC credits to banks and thrifts that invest in qualified distressed
communities. See id. These credits can be used to reduce their FDIC premiums. See id.
While proposed in Congress, these provisions failed to survive the Senate Conference
Report and were not included in the Riegle Act. See id.
85. It is a misstatement to say that the Riegle Act funds the BEA Act of 1991. In
theory, the BEA remains a separate program and could be funded independently. See id.
86. Distressed Communities are defined as such by 12 C.F.R. § 1805.301(d) (1998).
These communities have poverty rates of at least 20% and unemployment rates of at least
1.5 times the national average. See 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 19.
87. CDFIs must be certified CDFIs under the Core Program to qualify. See 12
C.F.R. § 1805.201 (1998).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 1805.301(d) (1998).
89. Id.
90. Testimony of Brown, supra note 67, at 55.
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specific regulations. 9' Total awards, however, range from 5% to 15%
of the dollar value of this increased investment activity. 92 Thus, on a
$25,000 increase in investment activity, a bank may receive between
$1,250 and $3,750 from the CDFI Fund. 9 3 Banks are free to use their
awards in any way they choose, but many banks pledge to reinvest
their award back into the community, thereby further increasing their
investment activity. Other banks offset the transaction and overhead
costs associated with their community activity. 94
Additional regulations prohibit banks from getting double
funding under the Core program and the BEA program if the bank
itself gets certified by the Fund as a CDFI. 9 The process outlined in
the regulations, however, describes traditional banks and CDFIs as
separate partners. Banks provide investments and support services to
match federal funds received by the CDFI. 96 In fact, anecdotal
evidence supports the view that CDFIs approach banks and thrifts with
proposals for partnership with BEA program awards as incentives for
the depository institutions to participate.97
B.

Who Gets Funded By The BEA Program:Profiles

BEA program recipients from the 1998 awards show a wide
range of activities and funding at divergent levels. 98 The BEA
91. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1806.201(b)(2)-(4) and 1806.202(a)-(b) (1998). For instance,
the BEA program recognizes the full principal amount of renewed loans and full amounts

of rolled over deposits but not refinancings in determining the baseline for increased
investments. See id.
92. 1997 CDFI FUND ANN. REP. 19.

93. See 12 C.F.R. § 1806.203.

If a bank makes its investment in a qualified

distressed community, it is eligible for a BEA award at the 5% level.

See id. If the

investment is in a CDFI, the bank is eligible at the 15% level. See id.
94. This point raises the question, discussed below, about what else banks and thrifts

gain from the program, namely, fulfilled CRA obligations. See infra notes 143-66 and
accompanying text.
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 1806.102 (1998). Not only conventional banks can benefit from
the BEA program. Depository institutions that are themselves CDFIs, such as a

microlending fund, may also benefit. As a CDFI, the depository institution can apply for
support under either the Core program or the BEA program. But the CDFI is prohibited
from funding under both programs within a 12-month period, and it is prohibited from

receiving funding for the same activities for which it has already received Fund support.
See id. § 1806.102 (a)(2)-(3) (1998).
96. See id. § 1806.102(b) (1998).
97. See Testimony of England-Joseph,supra note 54, at 249.

98. See infra Appendix, Table One.
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program has benefited from increasing appropriations from Congress.
Furthermore, the BEA awards have continued to constitute
approximately 30% of the total expenditures from the Fund in any
fiscal year. 99
Table One shows the increase in the number of applicants and
the number of awardees between fiscal years 1996 and 1997.'°°
Preliminary figures show the number of applicants increased in the
1998 round to 104 applications by June 1998, a 29% increase."0
While the number of applicants rose between 1996 and 1997, the
amount of money available for the Fund to allocate did not rise as fast.
The size of the median award thus fell over the 1996 to 1997 period.
Preliminary figures for 1998, however, show 79 institutions dividing
$27,976,608 in funds, with an increased median award size of
$120,628.102 It remains to be seen if continued appropriation level
increases in 1999 will mean a continued increase in the median award
size for the year, or whether demand for Fund dollars will continue to
increase as well."13 The Fund only recently completed accepting
applications for the 1999 round of awards.'0 4
The investments that banks and thrifts make that may qualify
the institution for the BEA program include: "purchase of equity in a
CDFI; purchase of shares, providing grant funding for particular
projects, including projects involving the provision of tax credits; or
simply placing equity-equivalent forms of funding in those CDFIs
which cannot sell shares, like community development credit unions
and most loan funds."' 0 5 These investments differ depending on the
type of CDFI and the CDFI's needs."0 6
Profiles show the types of investments that the CDFI Fund
recognized in its 1997 round with BEA program awards:
99. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03[3].
100. See infra Appendix, Table One.
101. See Testimony of Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 275.
102. See BEA Profiles, supra note 1.
103. See infra Appendix, Chart One.
104. The CDFI web page contains an application. See Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund, CDFI Fund Core Program:1999 Application (visited Oct. 23,
1998) <http://www.treas.gov/cdfi/> [hereinafter FundApplication].
105. See Santiago, supra note 11, at 627.
106. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (describing the different forms of
CDFIs). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the many types of investment
banks and thrifts can appropriately make to the various CDFIs.
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* NationsBank, NA Award: $1,252,500
NationsBank made numerous equity investments and
loans totaling more than $11,850,000 to CDFIs
including Enterprise Corporation of the Delta (ECD) in
Mississippi, First State Community Loan Fund,
Ethiopian Community Development Council, Self-Help
Venture Fund and others.
* First Union National Bank Award: $2,154,900
First Union made grants, loans and investments in
CDFIs of over $28 million to Community Equity
Investments, Inc., Delaware Valley Community
Reinvestment Fund, Federation of Appalachian
Housing Enterprises, and Richmond Neighborhood
Housing Services, among others.
e Wachovia Bank, NA Award: $550,000
Wachovia made a single loan to Self-Help Ventures
Fund, a certified CDFI.
e Bank of Yazoo City Award: $3,750
The Bank of Yazoo City, of Yazoo, Mississippi made a
$25,000 equity investment in the Enterprise
Corporation of the Delta Investments, LLC, a venture
fund subsidiary of the Enterprise Corporation of the
Delta, a certified CDFI.
* Bank of America Community Development Bank
Award:
$1,513,647 Bank of America Community Development
Corporation increased its multi-family and commercial
real estate lending activities within distressed
07
communities in the state of California.1
C.

Application Processfor Banks and Thrifts Under the BEA
Program

The application process for assistance from the BEA program
follows a unique model that differs from standard government form
107. BEA Profiles, supra note 1.
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applications. Applicants fill out a lengthy strategic plan for their
request, including:'o 8
• A five-year Business Plan;
"
An analysis of the needs of the proposed
"investment area," "target population," or CDFI;
* A strategy for meeting those needs;
A plan to coordinate efforts with existing
*
government and private sector programs; and
* An explanation of how such programs are consistent
with existing development plans in the targeted
population or investment area. 109
Applications become available subject to a Notice of Funds
Availability (NOFA) published in the Federal Register. " 0 The NOFA
sets deadlines and includes an updated set of questions for formulating
a strategic plan."'
The staff at the Fund applies mandated criteria to the
application to determine the funding award. The criteria of the
applicant are applied on a competitive basis."' Factors include:
* Their ability to meet eligibility requirements,
expanded economic opportunities, and increase
resources through coordination with other institutions;
* The extent the targeted population or investment
area is in need of financial assistance or in distress;
* The experience of the management team;
* The extent of support from the investment area;
* The extent to which the CDFI is community-owned
or community-governed;" 3 and
* The geographic diversity of the applicants. 114
108. 12 C.F.R. § 1805.701 (1998).
109. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03.; see also FundApplication, supra
note 104 (describing the application process).
110. See 12 C.F.R. § 1805.700 (1998).
111. See FundApplication, supra note 104.
112. See 12 C.F.R. § 1805.800 (1998).
113. Id. § 1805.802 (1998).
114. Id. § 1805.801; see also Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.03 (describing
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When institutions are accepted to participate in the BEA
program, they enter into a unique assistance agreement with the
Fund." 5 This agreement aligns the performance goals of the bank or
thrift as stated in the business plan, recipient CDFIs and the CDFI
Fund. 116 Banks and thrifts have complained that this process is
7
burdensome because of its unconventional format. "1
IV. USING THE BEA PROGRAM TO MEET CRA REQUIREMENTS

A.

History of the CRA

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977"' imposes
obligations on banks to "lend and invest a portion of their assets in the
communities from which they solicit deposits." "9 The original law set
the goals of increased investment in low-income communities, ' but it
remained vague as to how to achieve these goals. '' Responsibility for
clarifying the means banks use to satisfy their CRA obligation has
the criteria applied to depository institutions).
115. See 12 C.F.R. § 1805.901 (1998).

116. See 1997 CDFI FUND

ANN. REP.

18.

See Testimony of Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 1105. Recently passed legislation
promises to streamline this process for banks and thrifts. See id. It remains to be seen
what effect this change will have in practice.
118. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907. The regulations, which have caused considerably more
controversy, are located in four places, one for each regulatory body: for the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency at 12 C.F.R. pt 25 (1998); for the Federal Reserve System at
12 C.F.R. pt 228 (1997); for the FDIC at 12 C.F.R. pt 345 (1997); and for the Office of
Thrift Supervision at 12 C.F.R. pt 563(e) (1997).
119. Santiago, supra note 11, at 573; see also S. REP. No. 169, at 12 (1994), reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1896 ("Community groups estimate that banks have
committed about $35 billion since 1977 in lending and equity investment in traditionally
underserved communities as a result of CRA agreements reached with community groups
as well as unilateral action").
120. See Spencer, supra note 26, at 169. "Redlining" and "disinvestment" are two
conditions that afflict a community that the CRA is designed to address. See Runck,
supra note 3, at 527-30 (arguing the CRA only helps reverse the effects of irrational
redlining, i.e., racial discrimination). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the
effects the CRA has had on reversing these conditions, or why these conditions occur.
See id. See generally EIGHT CITY PROFILE, supra note 26; Santiago, supra note 11.
121. See Spencer, supra note 26, at 169. See also Warren L Dennis, The Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community," 95
117.
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Consequently, the "CRA has
been left to regulatory agencies.'
resulted in fierce competition among different interests seeking to
provide the 'correct' interpretation of the law" and the issue has been
resolved "before the regulators, legislatures and in the court of public
opinion [rather than in courts of law]." 123 The primary way regulators
have enforced the CRA against banks is by withholding permission for
banks to merge or add branches.' 24
The banking industry has raised significant objections to the
CRA. The industry has argued that the CRA requires banks to
sacrifice profits by forcing banks to make loans and investments in
low-income communities on terms not supported by their assessment
of the market. 125 Higher risk in the loan portfolio and the extensive
reporting requirements necessary for the enforcement of the CRA have
raised costs for banks. A study by Professors Jonathan Macey and
Geoffrey Miller points out that "bankers today regard the CRA as the
single most costly regulation facing them, a statement that carries
weight in light of the manifold, complex, and arcane regulations
governing depository institutions today." 126 The weight of this
regulatory burden places the industry at a competitive disadvantage to
other financial industries "such as mutual funds, insurance companies,
mortgage banks and consumer finance firms.' 127 Finally, the
ambiguous character of the CRA rating system has led some
commentators to conclude that regulators can assign an arbitrary
rating, often merely responding to the wishes of community activist
groups that might have other motives. 12' Bank objections to the CRA
122. See Spencer, supra note 26, at 169 (citing "The Community Reinvestment Act:
Evolution and Current Issues", 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 251, 251 (1993)) ("The agencies are
the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.").
123. Santiago, supra note 11, at 573.; see also Spencer, supra note 26, at 169

(analyzing community groups' failure to win standing under the Bank Holding Company
Act to challenge a Federal Reserve Board decision to allow a bank merger in Lee v. Board
of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 118 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 1997)).
124. Lash, supra note 36, at 391.
125. See Runck, supra note 3, at 527.
126. Id. at 528 (quoting Ronald Grzywinsky, The New Old-FashionedBanking, HARV.

Bus. REv., May-June 1991, at 93).
127.
128.
Act: A
Macey

Id.
See id. at 528-29 (citing Leonard Bierman et al., The Community Reinvestment
Preliminary EmpiricalAnalysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1994) and Jonathan R.
& Geoffrey Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79

VA. L. REV. 291 (1993)).
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have not gone unnoticed by policy makers.
Conflict between banks and community groups about the goals
of the CRA and its requirements for banks to comply prompted
President Clinton in 1993 to direct federal regulatory agencies to
"establish a new compliance framework" which would stimulate "the
creation of productive partnerships" between community activist
groups and banks. 129 The result was a new series of regulations that,
because of their complexity and because of the extent of their changes,
were phased in between January 1, 1996 and July 1, 1997.130 These
new regulations encourage banks to meet their CRA obligations by
investing in and supporting CDFIs. 131
B.

New Regulations

Several of the characteristics of the new regulations are
significant. The new CRA regulatory scheme replaces the longcriticized twelve-factor analysis. 132 Instead, it gives banks and thrifts
the option of choosing a three-part lending, 3 1 investment13 4 and

129. Santiago, supra note 11, at 575.
130. See id.
131. See supra notes 84-117 and accompanying text. These investments also make
banks eligible for awards under the BEA program. See id.
132. See Warren W. Traiger, Where Art Thou, Twelve Assessment Factors?:Not Too
FarAway, After All, in ABA BANK COMPLIANCE (Summer 1996); see also Santiago, supra
note 11, at 610.
These factors largely emphasized direct lending, spelling out for a
bank the kinds of activities and documentation which were necessary
for a high rating. The new rules replaced the old assessment factors
with new language that stresses flexibility for banks in CRA
compliance and emphasizes activities which the bank has actually
performed that benefit the community.
Id.
133. See Santiago, supra note 11, at 619-26 (citing 12 C.F.R. 228.22 (1997)). Under
the lending part of the test, banks are required to meet the credit needs of their community
with direct mortgage, small business, and small farm lending and community development
activities including indirect lending. See id. This test is combined with the other two tests
in the three-part test to derive a total CRA compliance score. See id. The quantitative
score is weighted by the performance of the reinvestment activity in the community. See
id. Thus, banks could not make ineffectual loans and still comply. See id.
134. See id. at 626-29 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 228.23 (1997)). Under the investment part
of the test, banks are required to make qualified investments in the form of deposits,
shares, or grants with the principle purpose of meeting community development needs.

See id.

1999]

CREDITA VAILABILITY

service'

test or developing a custom "strategic plan" 136 compliance

test."'

Also, the new scheme is conducted "in a 'performance

context,' where [regulators] take into account the special
characteristics and demographics of the bank's local service
community ... ."8 and look to outcomes in the community rather
than activities within the bank.' 3 9

The scoring mechanism has

remained unchanged. Banks receive a score that rates their CRA
compliance either "outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve,"
or "substantial noncompliance." 140
C.

Analysis

The new CRA regulations encourage banks and thrifts to
comply with their reinvestment obligations by investing in and serving
CDFIs.14 1 The new regulations introduce references to "third party
intermediaries" and "organizations with which a bank can partner to
fulfill its CRA requirements." 142 This reference marks a shift from
direct investment activity on the part of banks and invites the use of
CDFIs as intermediaries. Also, the regulations include in their
definition section a heavy emphasis on "community development" ' 43
and define it in a way that encourages indirect investment through

135. See id. at 629-33 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 228.24 (1997)). The service part of the test
requires banks to show presence in their community with automatic teller machines, pointof-access branches, and other needed services. Arguably, this test encourages banks to
partner with CDFIs by referrals, on sight ATMs and other business and human resources.

See id.
136. Id. at 639-44 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 228.27 (1997)). Very few banks have embarked
on the path of developing a strategic plan test. See id. This test would allow banks to
custom design the criteria by which their reinvestment activity should be judged by
regulators. See id.
137. See id. at 610 (citing Warren W. Traiger, Where Art Thou, Twelve Assessment
Factors?: Not Too Far Away, After All, in ABA BANK COMPLIANCE (Summer 1996)).
The 12 factors can still be found in the new regulatory scheme. See Santiago, supra note
11, at 610. Also, there are additional CRA tests under the new regulatory framework for
Small Banks and Wholesale and Limited Purpose Banks. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.12 (1997);
see also 12 C.F.R. § 228.25 (1997).
138. Santiago, supra note 11, at 610.
139. See id. at 591.
140. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2906(b)(2) (West 1997); 12 C.F.R. § 228.28 (1997).
141. See Santiago, supra note 11, at 571.
142. Id.at611.
143. 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(h) (1997).
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CDFIs.' 44 The regulations require that all investments and services
performed through a third party intermediary be classified as
"community development." 145 Furthermore, the definition section of
the new regulations emphasizes compliance by defining a "qualified
investment" as: "investments, grants, deposits or shares in or to
financial intermediaries (including but not limited to CDFIs.. .) that
primarily lend or facilitate lending. .. in order to promote community
development." 146 In other words, qualified investments refer to
investments in a community-based organization dealing in financing,
which is precisely the definition of a CDFI.' 47
The new CRA regulations complement the mission of the
CDFI Fund and the BEA program. If the old regulations encouraged
direct community lending activities, 148 the new regulations clearly
encourage compliance through indirect activity. 149 While the BEA
program provides monetary benefits for bank investments in CDFIs,
the new CRA regulations invite banks to pursue the same path by
partnering with CDFI intermediaries.
Policy makers now encourage depository institutions to pursue
partnerships with CDFIs as a way to meet CRA obligations and offer
BEA program awards as incentives.
In November 1998, a
Department of Treasury representative was quoted in The American
Banker advertising the BEA program as a "no-strings financial
incentive for boosting CRA lending." o In the early years of the
Clinton administration, however, this incentive was in doubt. 15 At
that time, Housing and Urban Development Secretary, Henry
Cisneros, opposed allowing BEA program awards to aid in CRA
compliance, thereby letting depository institutions "off the hook" of
144. See Santiago, supra note 11, at 613 (noting "[t]here are CDFIs and other forms of
community-based groups which already provide these non-economic development or
housing forms of services . . .")
145. 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a)(3) (1997).
146. Id. § 228.12(s) (1997).
147. Santiago, supra note 11, at 611 (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 22,162 n.3 (1995)).
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
150. Louis Whiteman, Treasury Invites Applicationsfor CRA Lending Awards, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 17, 1998, at 6.
151. See Jeffrey S. Lesk & Richard M. Price, An Introduction to the Community
Development Bank Network, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 267, 273

(1995).
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their CRA obligations. 52 Now, however, under the new regulatory
framework of the CRA and in light of the advertisement by the
Department of Treasury, 153 there remains little doubt that banks can
receive BEA program awards and get credit toward their CRA
obligations at the same time.
There are new costs associated with using CDFIs as
intermediaries in community reinvestment activity,' 54 and the
characterization of BEA program awards as "no-strings financial
incentives "' 55 does not accurately describe the program. While
priority at the CDFI Fund may be given to banks and thrifts that invest
in CDFIs, banks and thrifts may find high regulatory, reporting and
application burdens from the program that stem from the assistance
This
agreement and the business plan application process.' 56
requires
and
forms
government
standard
than
paperwork is different
extensive reflection on a bank's activity and purposes in community
development. 157 The costs of this analysis must be judged against any
benefits the bank would receive from CRA compliance or BEA
program money.
Depository institutions could suffer at the mercy of CDFIs in
meeting their CRA goals. Investing in a CDFI or in a qualified
distressed community may not ensure an "outstanding" performance
rating under the CRA.158 The regulations may require more of banks
and thrifts. It is possible that investing in a CDFI that "fails to meet
its performance goals ... could have negative implications on the

[bank's] CRA rating, especially if the [bank] does not otherwise meet
its CRA objectives.

59

But there is no evidence to suggest banks

incur this cost. In fact, one bank interviewed by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) received BEA program money for
investment in a CDFI that was dissolved. 60 When contacted by the
152. Id. (citing Clinton, Cisneros Stress Importance of CDGB Role in Economic
Stimulus, 20 Hous. & Dev. Rep., 874, 875 (1993)).
153. See Whiteman, supra note 150, at 6.
154. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.04[4].
155. See Whiteman, supra note 150, at 6.
156. See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.04[4].
157. See id.

158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See Testimony of England-Joseph,supra note 54, at 250.
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CDFI Fund, the bank amended its assistance agreement and moved its
investment to another CDFI. 161 While there is no indication that the
bank's CRA rating suffered as the result of the CDFI failure, the case
does illustrate a pitfall banks may face when using intermediaries to
fulfill their reinvestment obligations. '62
The exact impact that BEA program awards have had on bank
investment activity remains unclear. When the GAO interviewed
other banks that received awards, it found it "difficult to isolate the
impact of the BEA award from the effects of other incentives," 163
including, regulatory compliance with the CRA, community relations
incentives and the drive to increase market share in areas targeted by
the BEA program.' 64 Because the BEA program is new, data remains
limited regarding the full costs and benefits of bank investment in
65
CDFIs.1
V. CONCLUSION: THE BEA PROGRAM REWARDS CRA ACTIVITY
The new CRA regulations arguably encourage banks to fulfill
part of their reinvestment obligations through investments in and
service to CDFIs. 66 Banks can apply for BEA program awards for
investments they make in CDFIs. 167 As the amount of money
available from the CDFI Fund increases in 1999 and perhaps in future
budget years, banks have a heightened interest in applying for BEA
program awards for their community development and reinvestment
activities. 6 Furthermore, as the number and types of CDFIs grow in

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id.

164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text. This thesis is not fully reflected
in banking activity. A letter from the New York Bankers Association asserts "banks are
strongly encouraged to fulfill their CRA obligations through direct loans, investments and

services in their local areas [rather than through CDFIs]".
556

(quoting

letter

from

New

York

State

Banking

Santiago, supra note 11, at
Department

to

Senator

Santiago) (January 27, 1998). This raises an important point. If direct loans, investments,
and services are targeted to qualified distressed communities, the banks can still apply for
awards under the BEA program of the CDFI Fund, even if the activity is not directed to a
CDFI.

167. See supra notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 59-61, 66-71 and accompanying text.
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low-income markets, banks will have a greater choice of partners. 169
As the CDFI Fund continues with future rounds of awards and begins
to get greater feedback from banks, the true costs and benefits of the
program will become apparent. 7 As long as policy makers advertise
the BEA program awards as incentives to increase CRA lending, it
seems safe to conclude that depository institutions can receive award
money and get CRA credit as well.' 7 ' At least, the award from the
BEA program of 5 % to 15 % of increased investment activity should
cover the transaction and overhead costs associated with participating
in the program.' 72 For now, banks and thrifts have an interest in using
the resources of the BEA program to help meet their CRA
73
obligations. 1
CALVIN CUNNINGHAM

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
See Indick & Delaney, supra note 12, at 7.04[4].
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Chart One:
CDFI Fund Appropriation Levels
from Congress
74
by Budget Year

80

Million
of
Dollars

50

45

50

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Chart Two:
Funding Levels for Core and BEA Programs 1996 and 1997175

Core Program
Million
of
Dollars

$38.3
$37.2
BEA Program
31
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$16.5

48
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1996

174. 1997 CDFI FUNDANN. REP. 14
175. Id. at21.
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Table One:
BEA Program Profiles 1996 and 1997176

TRP.A Prnomam

BEA ProoTam

FY
1996
FY 1996

a,+
Number of Applicants
Total Number of Awardees 38
$13,138,703
Total Award
Disbursed as of
9/30/97
Highest Award
Lowest Award
Average Award
Median Award

176. Id.

FY 1997
74
54

$16,503,919

78% $10,274,680

$N/A

$2,699,625

$2,517,024
$1,100
$305,628
$72,875

$3,750
$345,755

$98,685
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